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State Campaign Finance Schemes
and Equal Protection
INTRODUCTION
Since 1974, when Congress established public financing of United States
presidential elections,' several states have chosen to subsidize various state
campaign expenses. 2 These state schemes necessarily set forth criteria deter-
mining who shall receive how much support,3 and such criteria inevitably
exclude some aspiring candidates or parties from public subsidy.4 This Note
1. Federal Election Campaign Act, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1975) (codified
in scattered sections of 2, 5, 18, 26, 47 U.S.C.), amending Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3
(1972) (codified in scattered sections of 2, 18, 47 U.S.C.). The specific financing provisions
are found in Subtitle H of the Inter. Rev. Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001 to 9012, 9031 to
9042 (1982).
2. See ALA. CODE § 17-16-2 (1975), § 40-18-146 (Supp. 1985); ALASKA STAT. § 43.20.013
(1983); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-804(A) (1984), § 43-1059 (1980); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-
2016.5 (1980); CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 17245, 18701 to 18760 (West Supp. 1985), ELEC.
CODE § 6430 (West 1977); D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1806.5 (1981 & Supp. 1985); HAWAII REv.
STAT. §§ 11-208 to -209, 11-217 to -229 (Supp. 1984), § 235-102.5 (Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE
39 34-501, 34-2501 to -2505 (1981 & Supp. 1984), § 63-3088 (1976 & Supp. 1985); IND. CODE§§ 9-7-5.5-1 to -10 (1982 & Supp. 1985); IowA CODE ANN. § 43.2 (West 1973 & Supp. 1985),
§§ 56.18 to .26 (West Supp. 1985); KY. REv. STAT. §§ 118.015, 121.230, 141.071 to .073 (1982
& Supp. 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1 (1983 & Supp. 1984), § 321 (1983), tit. 36,§ 5283 (1978); MASs. ANN. LAws ch. 10, §§ 43 to 45 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1980), ch. 50, §
1, ch. 53, § 6, ch. 55A, §§ 1 to 12, ch. 62, § 6C (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1978 & Supp. 1985);
MICH. Cotp. LAws ANN. §§ 169.271 to .281 (West Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 10A.01,
10A.25, 10A.30 to .33 (West 1977 & Supp. 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 13-37-301 to -308
(1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 19:44A-7, 44A-27 to -44 (West Supp. 1985), § 54A:9-25.1 (West
1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-159.1 (1979 & Supp. 1985), §§ 163-96, 163-278.41 to .45, 163-
278.6 (1982 & Supp. 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 1-107 to -109, 5-112 (West 1976 &
Supp. 1984), §§ 18-101 to -113 (West Supp. 1984); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 248.008, 316.102 (1983);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-12.1-12 (1981), § 44-30-2(e) (1980 & Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. §
20-3-2(g) (1984), §§ 59-14A-99 to -100 (Supp. 1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 11.26, 11.50, 20.855
(West Supp. 1985).
The Indiana statute, IND. CODE §§ 9-7-5.5-1 to -10 (1982 & Supp. 1985), which prompted
this Note, is not codified in either the election chapter or the taxation chapter of the code. It
is generally not included in summaries of state campaign finance schemes, perhaps because it
is part of the motor vehicles chapter. It is uncertain how many other states might similarly
enact or codify their campaign finance schemes.
3. Every subsidy scheme will differentiate among potential recipients, and thus discriminate
among them.
4. Any scheme that defines, by necessity, what "candidate" or "party" is worthy of public
funding, will deny funds to some individuals or groups that claim a right to subsidy. This Note
uses the term "nonmajor" to describe those parties and candidates (and their supporters) that
receive a relatively small share of public support, and thus often a reduced share, or no share,
of public subsidies.
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examines whether or not particular states' exclusions of candidates or parties
from public support violate the equal protection mandate of the fourteenth
amendment. In Buckley v. Valeo,5 the United States Supreme Court com-
prehensively reviewed the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA),6 and
upheld its discriminatory financing provisions despite equal protection chal-
lenges brought by 'nonmajor' candidates, parties, and voters.7 This Note
construes Buckley to render several current state statutes unconstitutional as
violative of equal protection requirements.8
Part I of this Note suggests that the Buckley Court validated FECA's
discriminatory subsidy provisions by utilizing something less than strict scru-
tiny in its equal protection analysis. 9 Relaxed scrutiny was appropriate only
because FECA imposed significant campaign expenditure ceilings on those
candidates who accepted the federal subsidies. Most state schemes, however,
do not impose significant expenditure ceilings upon subsidy recipients, and
thus must undergo equal protection's strict scrutiny.
Unlike FECA, some state schemes emphasize subsidies to political parties
rather than to candidates. FECA and the state schemes also differ in their
subsidy mechanisms, which include tax checkoff options, tax credits, tax
deductions, designatable tax checkoffs, and matching fund grants. Part II
of this Note suggests that these differences between FECA and the state
schemes should not alter the level of equal protection scrutiny.'0
Finally, this Note discusses the various state campaign financing laws in
existence, compares their provisions to the constitutional requirements framed
5. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
6. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 2, 5, 18, 26, 47 U.S.C.).
7. 424 U.S. at 143-44.
8. Despite the many and varied state campaign finance schemes now in place, the courts
have faced few challenges to the states' treatment of minor parties, candidates, or voters. But
see infra notes 224-47 and accompanying text (discussing two federal court decisions).
At least one commentator has suggested that state schemes offer good "laboratories of reform"
to evaluate different approaches to the complex issues of public campaign financing, and to
help refine our analysis of these schemes. Jones, State Public Financing and the State Parties,
in PARTiEs, INTEREsT GRoups, AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS 283, 285-6 (M. Mabin ed. 1980).
This Note contends that the state schemes developed after FECA and Buckley have gone in
the wrong direction in treating minor parties, candidates, and voters, and require constitutional
restraint. As one commentator, with misplaced optimism, noted: "Inasmuch as some state
courts have interpreted their own equal protection provisions more expansively than has the
Supreme Court ... there is some slight hope that state statutes discriminating against nonmajor
party candidates, such as those upheld in Buckley, will be invalidated." Nicholson, Buckley v.
Valeo: The Constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 1977
Wis. L. REv. 323, 374 n.229 [hereinafter cited as Nicholson, 1974 Amendments]. In fact, states
seem to have performed exactly contrary to this expressed hope, even transgressing those
boundaries established in Buckley.
9. See infra notes 12-62 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 63-145 and accompanying text.
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in Buckley, and concludes that several schemes unconstitutionally discrimi-
nate against nonmajor parties or candidates."
I. A RELAXED SCRUTINY IN BUCKLEY v. VALEO
The Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo' 2 upheld against equal protection
challenges a federal statute that grants campaign subsidies to some presi-
dential candidates and denies them to others.' 3 Having validated a particular
scheme, Buckley establishes the foundation for analysis of similar state
statutes. '4 The Buckley decision seems to establish the principle that the
level of equal protection scrutiny invoked by a discriminatory subsidy scheme
can be relaxed if that scheme imposes "countervailing denials"-specifically
expenditure ceilings-on subsidy recipients.' 5 To elicit this principle, the
analysis must begin with an outline of the specific subsidy provisions (Subtitle
H)' 6 that the Buckley Court upheld.
Subtitle H provides for a public campaign finance fund 7 generated by
voluntary taxpayer checkoffs of one or two dollars per tax return.' 8 FECA
dispenses this fund through three schemes. First, candidates for President
in the general election may qualify for public subsidies in the form of block
grants.' 9 Second, political parties may qualify for block grants to subsidize
the cost of their Presidential nominating conventions.20 Third, candidates
11. See infra notes 146-252 and accompanying text.
12. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
13. See infra notes 17-35 and accompanying text.
14. Many prior cases faced the balancing required between efficient campaigns and equal
protection rights of voters, candidates, or parties. E.g., American Party of Texas v. White,
415 U.S. 767 (1974); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S.
649 (1949). Buckley was the first case comprehensively to evaluate such a broad financing
scheme as FECA, and the only such case to date, and so provides the logical source of
constitutional doctrines. See The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARv. L. Ray. 56, 173 n.10
(1976); Comment, Buckley v. Valeo: The Supreme Court and Federal Campaign Reform, 76
COLUM. L. Rv. 852, 853 (1976).
Because Buckley determined that its fifth amendment analysis was identical with what
fourteenth amendment analysis would be, it establishes requirements for the state schemes as
well as FECA. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 93, citing to Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638
n.2 (1975). See also Fleishman, 1974 FECA Amendments, 1975 Duca L.J. 851, 883 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Fleishman, 1974 FECA Amendments]; Fleishman, Public Financing of
Election Campaigns: Constitutional Constraints on Steps Toward Equality of Political Influence
of Citizens, 52 N.C.L. REv. 349, 383 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Fleishman, Equality of
Influence].
15. See infra notes 34-48 and accompanying text.
16. 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001 to 9012, 9031 to 9042 (1982). Subtitle H distributes funds generated
by 26 U.S.C. § 6096 (1982), a dollar checkoff provision for income tax forms. This Note refers
to Subtitle H as including this provision.
17. 26 U.S.C. § 9006 (1982).
18. 26 U.S.C. § 6096 (1982). Since 1976 this fund has proven more than adequate to cover
all the expenses incurred by the operation of FECA.
19. § 9006(c).
20. § 9008(a).
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seeking the Presidential nomination of a political party through primary
elections may qualify for certain matching fund subsidies. 2' For purposes of
allocating these subsidies, FECA divides political parties into three groups,
based on their past vote totals. A "major-party" is a political party whose
candidate for President polled at least 25% of the total popular vote cast
for President in the most recent election. 22 A "minor party" is a political
party whose candidate for President polled at least 5% but less than 25%
of the popular vote cast at the most recent election. 23 Other political parties
are termed "new parties.''24
Block grants to Presidential candidates in the general election campaign
are disbursed only to candidates who agree to abide by an overall spending
ceiling (equal to the grant given to a candidate from a major party). 25 A
candidate who does not receive public funds is not subject to the spending
ceiling. 26 Major party candidates who agree to the spending ceiling receive
a subsidy to finance general election campaigning (set at twenty million
dollars and indexed for inflation in 1974).27 A minor party candidate receives
a subsidy in proportion to the popular votes that party's candidate received
compared to the average popular vote received by major party candidates
in the most recent election. 28 A new party candidate receives no subsidy for
the general election campaign. A post-election subsidy may be available to
a candidate of a new or minor party who increases her vote total in the
current election. 29
Block grants to political parties holding nominating conventions are li-
kewise based on past vote-getting of the party. A major party receives a
certain amount for convention expenses (set at two million dollars and
indexed for inflation in 1974), and must limit convention expenditures to
that amount.30 A minor party is also subject to the spending limit, and
receives a proportion of that grant just as the minor party candidate did
for the general election. 3 New parties and parties without conventions receive
no subsidy and are not subject to the expenditure ceiling.
Congress provides matching funds to candidates seeking the Presidential
nomination of a political party only if the candidate agrees to spending
21. § 9037(a).
22. § 9002(6).
23. § 9002(7).
24. § 9002(8). This Note, like Buckley, does not consider the specific issues that independent
candidates would raise if they were treated differently merely because not affiliated with an
official party.
25. § 9003.
26. 424 U.S. at 95.
27. § 9004(a)(1) (refers to 18 U.S.C. § 608(c)(1)(B) & 608(d) (1982)).
28. § 9004(a)(2).
29. § 9004(a)(3).
30. § 9008(b) & (d).
31. Id.
[Vol. 61:251
STATE CAMPAIGN FINANCE SCHEMES
ceilings, and raises $5,000 in each of twenty states, counting only the first
$250 of any individual contribution.32 Qualifying candidates receive dollar-
for-dollar matching grants up to the spending ceiling.33
The Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of Subtitle H in its
entirety, 34 notwithstanding a multitude of precedents revealing an unwavering
support of the rights to vote effectively and to run for public office. 35
Although the right to an effective vote is not explicitly stated in the Con-
stitution, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a constitutional right
to an effective vote does exist,3 6 and that discriminatory restrictions of this
right must undergo strict scrutiny in equal protection analysis.3 7 The Court
has also established that the right to run for public office, including gaining
access to the electoral ballot, is a fundamental right derived from a citizen's
right to vote effectively.3 The appellants in Buckley, and many commentators
on FECA, contended that these cases demanded strict scrutiny against Sub-
32. § 9033(b).
33. § 9034 (18 U.S.C. § 608(c)(1)(A) establishes a $10 million ceiling, indexed for inflation).
34. 424 U.S. at 108-09. The Court found that Subtitle H was within the general welfare
powers of Congress, id. at 90, was not an abridgement of the first amendment, id. at 93, and
did not violate the equal protection guarantee of the fifth amendment, id. at 108. The Court
did acknowledge that it only found Subtitle H was not facially invalid: "[Flactual proof that
the scheme is discriminatory in its effect" could allow the Court to find that Subtitle H
"invidiously discriminates against nonmajor parties." Id. at 97 n.131.
35. These precedents led many commentators to predict or urge that the Court strike down
Subtitle H as unconstitutional. See, e.g., Fleishman, 1974 FECA Amendments, supra note 14,
at 886-90; Rosenthal, Campaign Financing and the Constitution, 9 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 359,
411-16 (1972); see also Casper, Williams v. Rhodes and Public Financing of Political Parties
Under the American and German Constitutions, 1969 Sup. CT. REv. 271, 284 (1969).
36. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) ("In decision after decision, this Court
has made clear that a citizen has a constitutionally protected right to participate in elections
on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction."); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419,
422 (1970); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964) ("the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and
democratic society ... preservative of other basic civil and political rights"); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (the right to vote is a "fundamental political right, because
preservative of all rights"). These cases concerned the constitutional right to vote in state
elections. The right to vote in federal elections is understood to derive from Article 1, § 2 of
the U.S. Constitution. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 314-15 (1941).
37. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969) (if a statute discriminates
regarding the right to vote, "the Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary
to promote a compelling state interest"); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. at 337; Evans v.
Cornman, 398 U.S. at 422 (restriction "must meet close constitutional scrutiny"). See Bullock
v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. at 667.
38. American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 780-81 (1974); Storer v. Brown, 415
U.S. 724, 729 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. at 144 (because the ballot restrictions had
a "real and appreciable impact on the exercise of the franchise ... related to the [financial]
resources of the voters," the restrictions must be "closely scrutinized"); Williams v. Rhodes,
393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968) (because ballot restrictions burdened the right to "vote effectively,"
the state must show a "compelling interest" to justify infringing these rights). See Manikas,
Campaign Finance, Public Contracts, and Equal Protection, 59 Cm. KENT L. REV. 817, 818
(1983). See generally Jordine, Ballot Access Rights: The Constitutional Status of the Right to
Run for Office, 1974 UTAH L. REv. 290 (1974).
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title H because the law infringed fundamental rights of nonmajor voters,
candidates, and parties. 3
9
The Buckley Court certainly recognized the significance of the case law
demanding strict scrutiny of statutes infringing the rights to vote effectively
and to run for office:
[R]estrictions on access to the electoral process must survive exacting
scrutiny. The restriction can be sustained only if it furthers a "vital"
governmental interest . . . that is "achieved by a means that does not
unfairly or unnecessarily burden either a minority party's or an individual
candidate's equally important interest in the continued availability of
political opportunity."''
But the Court explicitly distinguished the ballot-access cases and their ex-
acting scrutiny, emphasizing that those cases involved "direct burdens" on
a candidate's opportunities to run for office, and on a voter's right to
choose, while Subtitle H only denied nonmajor candidates and parties equal
public financing. 4' The denial of funding, according to the Court, did not
''prevent any candidate from getting on the ballot or any voter from casting
a vote for the candidate of his choice."
42
The Court properly went on to acknowledge that nonmajor candidates
and parties could claim a discriminatory "denial of the enhancement of the
opportunity to communicate with the electorate" that Subtitle H provides
to major candidates and parties. 43 Such a denial of enhancement, of course,
would generally invoke the same equal protection analysis as would a direct
restraint discriminatorily applied.44 At this point the Court took a funda-
mental-and incompletely reasoned-logical step:
But eligible candidates suffer a countervailing denial .... [A]cceptance
of public financing entails voluntary acceptance of an expenditure ceiling.
Non-eligible candidates are not subject to that limitation. Accordingly,
we conclude that public financing is generally less restrictive of access to
39. Reply Brief for Appellant at 55, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Fleishman, 1974
FECA Amendments, supra note 14, at 884; Nicholson, 1974 Amendments, supra note 8, at
348; Rosenthal, supra note 35, at 411-16. But see Fleishman, Equality of Influence, supra note
14, at 384-88.
40. 424 U.S. at 94 (citations omitted).
41. Id.
42. Id. Commentators have criticized the distinction between denying ballot access and
denying public funds, see, e.g., Fleishman, 1974 FECA Amendments, supra note 14, at 889
("jilt is difficult to imagine ... that the Court would choose to rest its decision on an extremely
narrow and formalistic distinction between ballot access and public subsidy of campaigns"),
but there is no hint that the Court intends to abandon the distinction.
43. 424 U.S. at 95.
44. The distinction between directly prohibiting the exercise of a right and conditioning a
privilege on the sacrifice of a right has been generally dissolved. See Fleishman, Equality of
Influence,. supra note 14, at 383; Rosenthal, supra note 35, at 415.
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the electoral process than the ballot-access regulations dealt with in prior
cases.45
Because denial of public subsidies was "generally less restrictive" than
ballot regulations, the Buckley Court proceeded to evaluate the provisions
of Subtitle H with a relaxed scrutiny,4 revealing at times quite a deferential
attitude toward Congress' discriminatory provisions. 47 The relaxed scrutiny
was justifiable only because the Court found that, on its face, Subtitle H
did not injure the relative ability of any party or candidate to compete for
office.
41
45. 424 U.S. at 95 (footnotes omitted).
46. The Buckley Court held that FECA's mandatory ceilings on overall campaign expend-
itures and on independent campaign expenditures were unconstitutional because violative of
fundamental first amendment rights of expression. 424 U.S. at 58. This holding seemed to
frustrate Congressional attempts to halt the exploding costs of campaigns and rationalize the
electoral process generally, but the Court made receipt of public subsidies under FECA con-
tingent upon agreement to voluntary expenditure ceilings. 26 U.S.C. §§ 9003, 9008 & 9033.
See Comment, supra note 14, at 883. While Congress may not always condition benefits on
requirements that it cannot impose directly, this expenditure ceiling requirement is probably
sufficiently related to the legitimate purposes of Congress to pass constitutional muster. See
The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, supra note 14, at 182 n.80. The only valid way to enforce
expenditure ceilings, thus, is to condition the granting of some related governmental benefit
upon agreement to the ceilings.
Of course the level of scrutiny to be applied to schemes challenged as violative of equal
protection is not normally understood to depend on the necessity or importance of the state
interest motivating the statute. The mere fact that expenditure ceilings could only be encouraged,
not mandated, would not relax equal protection scrutiny, despite the importance of the goal.
Rather, the level of scrutiny is determined by evaluating the nature of the classification embodied
in the statute, and then the state interest is measured against the discriminatory effects. The
Buckley Court relaxed the scrutiny not because of the importance of achieving expenditure
ceilings, but because the expenditure ceilings made the effect of the challenged classifications
nondiscriminatory. See infra notes 49-57 and accompanying text.
An interesting question would arise if the Court found that mandatory ceilings were con-
stitutional. This Note would still argue that scrutiny should be relaxed (because the effect of
the scheme would still be nondiscriminatory), but the state interest in excluding minor parties
would not be balanced by the sacrifice that the state elicits from subsidy recipients by agreement
to ceilings-these ceilings could be imposed directly. Subtitle H might be found unconstitutional
if expenditure ceilings could be mandated.
47. The Court upheld reliance on past vote totals to determine general election subsidy
levels, stating that Congress could find vote totals "preferable" to the suggested alternatives,
which "might be thought inappropriate." Id. at 106. The Court upheld the 5% threshold
required to receive any subsidies as a valid accommodation of competing interests, within a
"permissible range." Id. at 103-04. The Court found the requirement that a candidate qualify
for 10 state ballots was "not unreasonable." Id. at 104 n.140. The Court also found that
exclusive reliance on matching funds as a subsidy mechanism for primary elections was "not
an unreasonable way to measure popular support." Id. at 106.
48. See 424 U.S. at 99 ("since any major-party candidate accepting public financing of a
campaign voluntarily assents to a spending ceiling, other candidates will be able to spend more
in relation to the major-party candidates"); id. at 104 (expenditure ceilings "enhance the ability
of nonmajor parties to increase their spending relative to the major parties"); id. at 108
(expenditure ceilings let poorer candidates "increase their spending relative to [richer] candi-
dates").
If a factual inquiry revealed that Subtitle H's ceilings are so high as to be ineffective, then
19861
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Although many commentators expected the Court to apply strict scrutiny
and invalidate the discriminatory provisions,49 the relaxation of scrutiny
because of the countervailing denial imposed on subsidy recipients does have
roots in earlier ballot-access cases.5 0 These cases affirm the practice of con-
sidering in some detail the actual effect of the challenged discriminatory
statutory scheme in order to determine what level of scrutiny equal protection
demands.
In Bullock v. Carter, the Supreme Court evaluated a Texas scheme that
required various filing fees before ostensible candidates would be placed on
a ballot." The unanimous Court recognized that the scheme "creates barriers
to candidate access to the primary ballot," but cautioned that "[t]he existence
of such barriers does not of itself compel close scrutiny .... In approaching
candidate restrictions, it is essential to examine in a realistic light the extent
and nature of their impact on voters."' 52 Because the Court found a "real
and appreciable" adverse impact on voters, the Texas laws had to be "closely
scrutinized. ' 53 Similarly, in Jenness v. Fortson, the Court found that a
realistic look at the challenged classification revealed that the nonmajor
parties were not in fact injured, that to treat them as the major parties were
treated would actually have been more damaging to their position.5 4 The
Court in Storer v. Brown cited Williams v. Rhodes to affirm the need to
consider "the facts and circumstances behind the law" in order to evaluate
the challenged election laws. 55
These cases affirm the Buckley Court's consideration of the effect of
FECA on parties discriminated against as an approach consistent with past
reasoning. General principles underlying equal protection analysis also lend
support to a relaxed scrutiny in light of the significant expenditure ceilings
imposed. Principles introduced in United States v. Carolene Products,5 6 and
strict scrutiny would be appropriate just as if there were no ceilings. Commentators have
generally agreed that specific attention to the effects of a campaign finance scheme is essential
to determine its validity, see, e.g., Manikas, supra note 38, at 842-43; Nicholson, 1974 Amend-
ments, supra note 8. at 362-63; Rosenthal, supra note 35, at 416, and some have suggested
that attention to the effects of Subtitle H taken as a whole with FECA reveals unmistakeable
injury to nonmajor parties and candidates, e.g., Nicholson, 1974 Amendments, supra note 8,
at 362-63. The Buckley Court certainly left open the possibility that such a factual showing
would render Subtitle H invalid. 424 U.S. at 97 n.131.
49. See sources cited supra note 39.
50. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Jenness
v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
51. 405 U.S. at 135-38. One candidate for county judge was assessed a filing fee of $6,300.
Assessments exceeding $5,000 were typical for several offices in certain counties.
52. Id. at 143 (emphasis added; citations omitted). See also Fleishman, Equality of Influence,
supra note 14, at 388-89.
53. 405 U.S. at 144.
54. 403 U.S. at 441.
55. 415 U.S. at 730 (citing Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968)).
56. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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elaborated by Professor J.H. Ely, 7 suggest that the presence of expenditure
ceilings might justify a relaxed equal protection scrutiny.
In Carolene Products, Justice Stone offered that something more than
merely 'rational review' may be required with regard to "legislation which
restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring
about repeal of undesirable legislation," and with regard to legislation di-
rected at "discrete and insular minorities."158 Professor Ely, attempting to
develop a workable theory of judicial revew, suggests that a 'representation-
reinforcing' role is appropriate for the courts: the judiciary should be most
active when the political process does not seem to respond democratically,
when the "ins are choking off the channels of political change to ensure
that they will stay in and the outs will stay out."' 59 Stone and Ely would
likely agree, as a general matter, that when a legislature subsidizes campaigns
in a discriminatory way, strict scrutiny is proper, just as in poll-tax, residency-
requirement, and ballot-access cases. 60
Both ballot-access precedents and underlying equal protection principles
suggest that a discriminatory campaign financing scheme should in general
be subject to strict scrutiny, because of the burden it places on the funda-
mental rights to vote and to run for office, and because of the inherent
tendency of such a scheme to "freeze" the political status quo. If Subtitle
H contained no expenditure ceilings, therefore, it should undergo strict
scrutiny, and it should fail. No "vital" government interest can justify
requirements so burdensome as a 5% vote threshhold, or a $5,000 minimum
to be raised in each of 20 states to qualify for matching funds; much lower
threshholds would serve to exclude frivolous and hopeless candidacies and
57. J.H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JuDIcIAL REvIEw (1980).
58. 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
59. ELY, supra note 57, at 103.
60. Discriminatory campaign schemes seem an archetypical example of legislation that both
restricts normal political processes, and reflects the 'ins' ensuring that they stay in and that
the 'outs' stay out. Strict scrutiny should apply without regard to whether or not a legislature
states that the purpose of the legislation is to increase and further speech and political activities.
The rationale of Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), that when a state is not denying
fundamental rights but rather extending rights, a lesser scrutiny is proper, id. at 657, is not
appropriate with regard to discriminatory campaign finance schemes. The decision to assist
some voters, candidates, or parties and not others, should invoke strict scrutiny because of
the unavoidable self-interest behind such legislative schemes:
Because the latter [FECA Amendments of 1974] extensively regulates the financing
of election campaigns ... and because a sizable proportion of those who are
regulated by the legislation are the same as those who wrote the legislation, the
Katzenbach reform exception to meticulous scrutiny should not apply. Instead
the Court, prompted by the question "Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes," [Who
shall guard the guards] should be moved by the patent congressional self-interest
involved to examine the Amendments with the greatest care.
Fleishman, 1974 FECA Amendments, supra note 14, at 885 (footnotes omitted). See also
Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 628 (1969); Jones, supra note 8, at 294;
Nicholson, 1974 Amendments, supra note 8, at 349.
19861
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
parties. 6' No vital government interests would be abridged by providing
minimal funds to many more candidates than the Subtitle H restrictions
would allow.
If, on the other hand, a legislature conditions public subsidies on agreement
to significant expenditure ceilings, the judicial role may properly be more
limited. Effective spending limits tend to lessen the disparities in relative
spending between the top and bottom candidates, and thus do not injure
the unsupported candidate as unconditioned subsidies do. And a scheme
that imposes restrictions on major candidates does not raise the same sus-
picions about self-interest and "freezing" the status quo that unconditioned
subsidies do. 62 Because Subtitle H elicited agreements to significant expend-
iture ceilings from subsidy recipients, the Buckley Court found the scheme
"less restrictive" of access to the political process than ballot-access restric-
tions, and the Court utilized a relaxed scrutiny to uphold the scheme despite
equal protection challenges.
II. EQUAL PROTECTION CONSEQUENCES OF STATE VARIATIONS ON
FECA
The several state schemes that provide subsidies to political parties and
candidates63 include significant variations on the FECA scheme, but these
variations should not substantially alter the equal protection analysis Buckley
requires. States employ several different means both to measure qualification
for state subsidy and to distribute actual support. While these differences
do have some effect on equal protection analysis, the essential Buckley
framework should still apply to the various state schemes.
One issue arises because many states distribute their subsidies primarily
through political parties rather than through candidates as FECA does.6 A
second issue arises because many states generate the subsidy revenue differ-
ently from FECA and Subtitle H. 65 The federal scheme employs an income
tax checkoff that establishes a general campaign fund disbursed according
to statute. 66 Most state schemes employ mechanisms that allow a taxpayer
to designate directly the recipient of the public subsidy, through tax credits,
tax deductions, or a designatable tax checkoff. 67 Neither the method of
61. See infra notes 167-201 and accompanying text for a discussion of what state interests
might prevail under strict scrutiny.
62. This Note does not consider the significant claim that even restrictive ceilings should
raise suspicions because of the inherent advantages of incumbents.
63. See sources cited supra note 2.
64. See infra notes 68-108 and accompanying text.
65. See infra notes 109-49 and accompanying text.
66. 26 U.S.C. §§ 6096, 9001 to 9012, 9031 to 9042 (1982).
67. See infra notes 150-252 and accompanying text.
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distributing nor the mechanism of generating the subsidy serves to relax the
equal protection scrutiny established by Buckley.
A. Subsidizing Political Parties
The fact that a state scheme channels public subsidies more to parties
than to candidates might affect the proper equal protection analysis in three
ways. First, it might have no effect. Equal protection analysis might evaluate
discrimination against a political party exactly as it treats discrimination
against a political candidate. Second, distribution of public subsidies to a
party may 'deputize' the party such that its actions qualify as 'state action'
subject to fourteenth amendment requirements. Third, otherwise proper sub-
sidies may be invalid if they constitute a specialized support of a private
organization that infringes the rights of other individuals. 68 This Note argues
that in none of these analyses does the Buckley standard permit a more
relaxed scrutiny.
1. Discriminatory Subsidies
Strong support indicates that, for equal protection purposes, whether the
right to vote effectively is infringed by grants directly to candidates or rather
by grants to political parties is irrelevant. The Buckley Court itself suggested
this, citing American Party of Texas v. White 6' as support for the finding
that campaign subsidies are "less restrictive" than ballot-access regulations 7 0
and remarking: "That the aid in American Party was provided to parties
and not to candidates, as is most of Subtitle H funding, is immaterial."17'
If equal protection finds insignificant the difference between funding can-
didates and funding parties, then strict scrutiny applies to any scheme sub-
sidizing political parties unless that scheme contains a significant
"countervailing denial" of some kind, to which subsidy recipients are subject.
Without a countervailing denial, unfunded parties are injured, just as are
unfunded candidates, and warrant the constitutional protection of strict
scrutiny.72
68. It might be argued that any unrestricted subsidies given to political parties would be
invalid, as a special subsidy of only some groups exercising first amendment rights. Such
subsidies would, perhaps, discriminate against groups such as the John Birch Society, the
Teamsters Union, the American Civil Liberties Union, or the National Rifle Association, that
also organize for political/ideological purposes, and often mobilize for candidates. See infra
note 202 for a limited discussion of this issue.
69. 415 U.S. 767 (1974).
70. 424 U.S. at 95.
71. Id. at 95 n.130.
72. As outlined above, see supra note 36 and accompanying text, the right to an effective
vote is the wellspring of the constitutional protections. This right is equally hampered by
refusing to subsidize either a candidate or a party favored by a particular voter.
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The Supreme Court has twice faced, and twice upheld, public subsidies
to political parties despite equal protection challenges by nonmajor parties,
candidates, or voters. 73 Significantly, both cases involved schemes with coun-
tervailing denials. In American Party, the Court considered a Texas statutory
scheme that provided public subsidies only to major political parties to defray
some of the cost of primary elections.7 4 The state required a major party
to hold primary elections to nominate a candidate for the ballot, and required
no other political parties to do so.75 In upholding the scheme the Court
emphasized that Texas was merely subsidizing "in whole or in part," precisely
those costs that the major parties uniquely had to bear. 76 The Court deter-
mined that the nonmajor parties failed to show that they were in fact
discriminated against at all, inasmuch as Texas merely required more of
major parties, and helped pay for that extra cost.7 7
In Buckley the Court validated Congress' financing of the convention
expenses of major political parties, despite challenges by nonmajor parties
that the scheme invidiously discriminated against them. 78 In so holding, the
Court relied heavily on the reasoning with which it approved the general
election funding provisions of Subtitle H. The Court specifically found that
the "expenditure limitations on major parties participating in public financing
enhance the ability of nonmajor parties to increase their spending relative
to the major parties." ' 79 Nonmajor parties were actually helped by this
scheme, according to the Court: expenditure ceilings increased the chances
that a nonmajor party would improve its relative financial position. 0
In a subsidy scheme that provides funds to parties without such a coun-
tervailing denial, strict scrutiny should be invoked to protect the rights to
vote effectively and run for public office. The injury caused to a nonmajor
voter or candidate is equally damaging regardless of whether the state funds
the candidate's major party opponent directly, or channels funds to the
major party itself. Either state scheme directly injures the unfunded can-
didate's chance of winning, and thus should undergo strict scrutiny.8'
73. Buckley, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); American Party, 415 U.S. 767 (1974).
74. 415 U.S. at 791-94.
75. Nonmajor political parties could choose to nominate a candidate through their con-
ventions. Id. at 793.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 794 ("we are not persuaded that the State's refusal to reimburse for these
[nonprimary related] expenses is any discrimination at all against the smaller parties").
78. 424 U.S. at 104-05.
79. Id. at 104 (emphasis added).
80. 424 U.S. at 99 (suggesting spending limits reduce some major-candidate spending and
may thereby free up some contribution dollars to go to nonmajor candidates).
81. Special issues do arise when a subsidy scheme funds parties as well as, or instead of
candidates, see, e.g., infra notes 201-04 and accompanying text, but the level of scrutiny is
not lowered by this difference. See supra note 46. Strict scrutiny applies to discriminatory
schemes unless they include significant expenditure ceilings, whether fund recipients are political
candidates or parties, because the source of the constitutional protection-the right to vote
effectively-is equally injured in both instances.
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2. 'Deputizing' Subsidies
Apart from the question of whether a state might violate equal protection
by providing subsidies to some parties and not to others, a state might, by
directing a subsidy scheme toward parties, effectively "deputize" recipient
parties such that party actions themselves become state actions subject to
the fourteenth amendment. If a party's actions qualify as state actions under
the fourteenth amendment, then disbursals by the party directly to candi-
dates, or expenditures advocating election or defeat of a candidate, should
be subject to the same scrutiny as that directed against FECA and Congress
by Buckley. 2
The fourteenth amendment's guarantee of equal protection protects only
against action by a state,8 a but the concept of "state action" has undergone
considerable evolution. The onetime requirement that the deprivation be
done by the state government or its agents8 4 has been expanded to include
actions taken by a private individual or group with enough connection to
the government to allow an imputation of state actionY The difficulty is
what kind of "connection" is sufficient. Several cases have held that actions
by a political party constitute state action, 6 and others have suggested that
the allocation of funds to organizations may allocate state authority also,
thus invoking the fourteenth amendment.8 7 Each of these arguments bears
significantly on the validity of present state campaign finance laws, many
of which allocate funds to political parties.
The first line of cases derives from the concept that a state must control
the electoral process, and that by delegating some such control, it may
delegate state authority also. In 1927 the Supreme Court held that a Texas
law prohibiting black residents from voting in Democratic Party primary
elections was a violation of the fourteenth amendment.88 Five years later the
Court appraised a Texas law that delegated to the state committees of political
parties the authority to determine primary election voter requirements. 9 The
Court found that the law delegated state authority to the committee, in
effect making it a state agent, such that its decision to exclude blacks from
82. If the party's actions become state action, that is, they are fully subject to the fourteenth
amendment. There does not seem to be any Supreme Court authority supporting a sliding
scale-the closer to state action, the more complete fourteenth amendment analysis becomes.
But see J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J.N. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 523-25 (2d ed. 1983)
[hereinafter cited as NowAK].
83. This basic principle was first established in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
84. Id. at 11.
85. See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
86. See infra notes 88-98 and accompanying text.
87. See infra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
88. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
89. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
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Democratic primaries violated the fourteenth amendment. 90 Despite an in-
tervening decision holding that a party convention vote to exclude blacks
from the primaries was not unconstitutional because it did not qualify as
state action, 9' the Court in Smith v. Allwright established that a decision by
a political party to exclude blacks from participating in primaries constituted
state action that violated the fifteenth amendment.9 2 The Court reasoned
that because the system of primaries was an "integral part of the entire
election machinery, ' 93 to entrust the party with authority to decide quali-
fications for primary voting was to delegate state authority, and racial
discrimination by the party was thus unconstitutional state action.94
The Court subsequently faced a challenge to a Texas county organization
called the "Jaybird Democratic Association." 9 Though outside any state
legislative controls, the Jaybird Party essentially ran a private pre-primary
election in which the members of the party-all white voters in the county-
selected a candidate who then regularly ran for and won the Democratic
Party nomination, and subsequently the general election.9 6 Although there
was no majority opinion, in striking down the election scheme as violative
of the fifteenth amendment the Court revealed a flexible and pragmatic
approach to the finding of state action. Justice Black wrote: "The only
election that has counted in this Texas county for more than fifty years has
been that held by the Jaybirds from which all Negroes were excluded....
The Jaybird primary has become an integral part, indeed the only effective
part, of the elective process that determines who shall rule and govern in
the county." '97 In his concurring opinion, Justice Clark added: "when a state
structures its electoral apparatus in a form which devolves upon a political
organization the uncontested choice of public officials, that organization
itself, in whatever disguise, takes on those attributes of government which
draw the Constitution's safeguards into play." 9
90. Id.
91. Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935).
92. 321 U.S. 649 (1944). Requirements of "state action" seem identical under the fourteenth
and fifteenth amendments. See generally NowAc, supra note 82, at 497-502.
93. 321 U.S. at 660 (citing United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 318 (1941)).
94. 321 U.S. at 664. The Court also included a farsighted caveat:
The United States is a constitutional democracy. Its organic law grants to all
citizens a right to participate in the choice of elected officials .... This grant to
the people of the opportunity for choice is not to be nullified by a State through
casting its electoral process in a form which permits a private organization to
practice racial discrimination in the election. Constitutional rights would be of
little value if they could be thus indirectly denied.
Id.
95. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
96. Id. at 462-63.
97. Id. at 469 (Black, J., plurality opinion).
98. Id. at 484 (Clark, J., concurring).
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These cases suggest that when a political party is directed by a state to
control a process as integral to the overall electoral process as is a primary
election, that party may be "deputized" such that its actions must conform
to fourteenth amendment requirements." State campaign finance laws are
often not as specific in delegating authority to a party,1°° and campaign
financing is different from primary election control. The state can, however,
"deputize" a political party by delegating authority to it. Actual state schemes
are considered below and involve the question of how much authority the
state must delegate before the fourteenth amendment attaches to party ac-
tion. 0 1
A second group of cases suggests that state action may be imputed to
private actors to whom the government has provided subsidies above the
general level of government benefits. 0 2 The Supreme Court has held, for
example, that the grant of free school books to all schools in a state was
unconstitutional when the subsidy benefited a racially discriminatory school.'03
The crucial question in determining whether a public subsidy constitutes state
action such that a private actor's actions are subject to equal protection
analysis may be "whether the aid amounts to something more than gener-
alized services.'"1 4 The determination of whether or not a state campaign
financing subsidy to political parties is more than a generalized service seems
to be quite a fact-specific issue, depending largely on how the subsidy is
structured. If the state subsidy operates through a tax-deduction scheme
offered to all contributors to nonprofit organizations, then the state has
probably not granted specialized services to the parties. 0 s However, if the
99. See also Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 818 (1969) (invalidating Illinois petition
requirements for independent candidates: "All procedures used by a State as an integral part
of the election process must pass muster against the charges of discrimination or of abridgment
of the right to vote."); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 374 (1963) ("the action of this party
in the conduct of its primary constitutes state action within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment"); McKenna v. Reilly, 419 F. Supp. 1179, 1185 (D.R.I. 1976) ("In light of the
extensive regulation and subsidization of the Democratic party in the case at bar, the court
finds that the party is under the mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment insofar as it allocates
public funds directly to certain of its candidates."); Nicholson, Campaign Financing and Equal
Protection, 26 STAN. L. Rav. 815, 831-32 (1974).
100. See infra notes 230-39 and accompanying text.
101. See infra notes 227-41 and accompanying text. Ultimately this Note argues that these
details are not essential for a determination that a state scheme operates unconstitutionally.
That determination can be supported with a finding either that party action is state action, or
that the state cannot provide specialized subsidies to private organizations that are infringing
individual rights.
102. See generally NowAK, supra note 82, at 518-21.
103. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973). But see Board of-Education v. Allen, 392
U.S. 236 (1968) (statute providing free books to all schools was not an unconstitutional subsidy
of parochial schools that received the books).
104. NowAK, supra note 82, at 519.
105. See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (liquor license and
tax-exempt status did not constitute specialized support by the state such that fourteenth
amendment applied to racial discrimination by a private club).
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state provides direct lump-sum grants to certain political parties, it may well
be providing more than generalized services.' °0 The various statutes are
discussed below.10
3. Discriminatory Party Action
Even in situations where the government subsidy is not sufficiently spec-
ialized or targeted to deputize the recipient party, equal protection may
determine that the state action is an unconstitutional support of private
discrimination. This issue is particularly significant when facing a state
scheme whose mechanism of subsidy is unlikely to delegate state authority
to a party, but whose specialized support to the parties nonetheless uncon-
stitutionally finances discriminatory private action. 08
B. Subsidy Mechanisms
The other issue implicated by the various state campaign finance schemes
that must be considered before applying the Buckley standard concerns the
mechanism of providing campaign subsidies. FECA generates funds for
campaign financing by an income checkoff' °9 that the Buckley Court found
to be "like any other appropriation from the general revenue.""10 Only a
minority of states, however, utilize such a tax checkoff or appropriation
from the general revenue to finance campaigns."' Most states use provisions
106. This is an issue the Supreme Court has not directly faced: what type of subsidy to a
private group will subject the recipient's actions to fourteenth amendment review. For purposes
of this Note this interesting issue need not be resolved. Given action by a political party that
infringes on the fundamental rights to vote effectively and to run for office (i.e. actions that
if taken by a state would constitute invidious discrimination against voters and candidates),
which is considered infra notes 227-49 and accompanying text, a state cannot provide direct
subsidies to that party, either as specialized tax subsidies or direct appropriations, because that
would constitute state support of discriminatory activity, and a state cannot subsidize others
to act in unconstitutional ways. See Falkenstein v. Department of Revenue, 350 F. Supp. 887
(D. Or. 1972) (three-judge district court), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1099 (1973); McGlotten
v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972) (three-judge district court); Pitts v. Department
of Revenue, 333 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (three-judge district court). All three cases
found that private racially discriminatory organizations could not receive specialized subsidies
from the government. See also Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961)
(Court held that the "State has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence [with
the private group] ... that it must be recognized as a joint participant.").
107. See infra notes 201-49 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 105-06; see also infra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
109. 26 U.S.C. § 6096 (1982).
110. 424 U.S. at 91. See also Fleishman, Equality of Influence, supra note 14, at 405.
111. Only six state schemes include a tax checkoff provision that generates a general campaign
fund then disbursed according to statutory prescription. HAWAII REv. STAT. § 235-102.5 (Supp.
1984); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 62, § 6C (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1978 & Supp. 1985); MICH. CoUP.
LAWS ANN. § 169.261 (West Supp. 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-37-303 (1985); N.J. STAT.
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such as income tax deductions available to contributors to certain political
parties" 2 or to certain candidates;" 3 income tax credits for contributors to
certain political parties" 4 or candidates;" 5 or income tax checkoffs with which
a taxpayer may designate that a portion of his tax liability be distributed
to a certain political party," 6 or by which he may increase his tax liability
and designate that the increase be donated to a certain political party."7
Despite these divergent mechanisms for generating and distributing subsidy
revenues, all of the state schemes should be subject to the same level of
equal protection scrutiny when challenged by nonmajor parties, candidates,
or voters.1 8
The treatment that tax provisions receive under equal protection analysis
is an obscure one. Courts generally appear to grant considerable latitude to
state tax statutes when considering constitutional, specifically equal protec-
tion, infirmities. For example, in Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, " 9
the Supreme Court rejected an equal protection challenge to an Ohio tax
statute alleged to discriminate based on state residency. 20 Finding that the
ANN. § 54A:9-25.1 (West 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 18-103 (West Supp. 1984). Two
states include provisions for a general fund generated by other means. Indiana imposes a $30
surcharge tax on each personalized automobile license plate sold by the state, and then distributes
the funds to eligible political parties. IND. CODE §§ 9-7-5.5-1 to -10 (1982 & Supp. 1985).
Wisconsin subsidizes campaigns directly out of general revenue, combined with a tax checkoff.
Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 11.50, 20.855 (West Supp. 1985).
112. ARuZ. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 43-1059 (1980); HAwAn REv. STAT. § 235-7(g)(1) (Supp.
1984).
113. ARiz. R v. STAT. Am. § 43-1059 (1980); ARK. STAT. ANN § 84-2016.5 (1980); HAwAn
Ray. STAT. § 235-7(g)(2) (Supp. 1984).
114. ALAsKA STAT. § 43.20.013 (1983); IDAHO CODE § 63-3088 (1976 & Supp. 1985); OR.
REv. STAT. § 316.102 (1983).
115. ALASKA STAT. § 43.20.013 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1806.5 (1981 & Supp. 1985):
OR. REv. STAT. § 316.102 (1983).
116. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 56.18 to -.26 (West Supp. 1985); Ky. REv. STAT. § 141.071 (1982
& Supp. 1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 10A.31 (West 1977 & Supp. 1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
105-159.1 (1979 & Supp. 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 18-103 (West Supp. 1984); R.I.
GEN. LAws § 44-30-2(e) (1980 & Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 59-14A-99 to -100 (Supp.
1985).
117. ALA. CODE § 40-18-146 (Supp. 1985); CAL. Rav. & TAX. CODE § 18720 (West Supp.
1985); ME. Ray. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 5283 (1978).
118. See Fleishman, Equality of Influence, supra note 14, at 403. Some commentators have
suggested that tax mechanisms avoid equal protection problems by putting the responsibility
for dispensing public funds on the many individual decisions made by taxpaying contributors
to campaigns. E.g., Rosenthal, supra note 35, at 417. This might be so if the private contributor/
taxpayer has full discretion to direct the subsidy to this or that recipient (disregarding other
problems with requiring private money to qualify for public money), but tax mechanisms
invariably define which candidates and parties do or do not qualify to receive tax deductible
contributions. This state decision-which parties and candidates qualify-is the state decision
equivalent to deciding who should receive direct public grants, and is subject to equivalent
equal protection scrutiny.
119. 358 U.S. 522 (1959).
120. Id. at 529.
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tax law could not be deemed "unreasonable," the Court expounded on how
state tax laws in general ought to be regarded:
The States have a very wide discretion in the laying of their taxes....
Of course, the States, in the exercise of their taxing power, are subject
to the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. But that clause imposes no iron rule of equality, prohibiting
the flexibility and variety that are appropriate to reasonable schemes of
state taxation.'2'
But a broad statement that "reasonable" tax laws should be upheld cannot
go unqualified.
Some state tax laws do unconstitutionally infringe federal rights. In Speiser
v. Randall,122 the Supreme Court struck down as violative of fourteenth
amendment due process a California statute that conditioned the granting
of a veterans' property tax exemption on the property owner signing a loyalty
oath. Though decided on procedural due process grounds, l21 Speiser suggests
that tax statutes should be subject to evaluation much like any other statute
that infringes speech:
To deny. . . [a tax] exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms
of speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech. Its deterrent
effect is the same as if the State were to fine them for this speech....
[T]he denial of a tax exemption for engaging in certain speech necessarily
will have the effect of coercing the claimants to refrain from the pro-
scribed speech. 24
In evaluating the due process claim the Court further held that because the
"transcendent value" of speech was implicated, the traditional tax procedures
that placed the burden of proof on the taxpayer were invalid.125 Speiser and
Allied Stores thus leave uncertain the status of discriminatory tax provi-
sions. 1 26
121. Id. at 526. See also Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940). The Madden Court held
that
in taxation, even more than in other fields, legislatures possess the greatest freedom
in classification .... [Tihe presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only
by the most explicit demonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive
discrimination against particular persons and classes. The burden is on the one
attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which
might support it.
Id. at 88. And see Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27, 28 (1958) (tax exemptions and
deductions are "a matter of grace [that] Congress can, of course, disallow ... as it chooses").
122. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
123. Id. at 529.
124. Id. at 518-19 (citations omitted).
125. Id. at 526.
126. In Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959), the Court upheld a federal tax
regulation that provided that lobbying expenses could not be deducted as business expenses.
Although the regulation clearly infringed on speech, the Court distinguished Speiser, noting
that the regulation merely put everyone "on the same footing" with regard to "purchased
publicity," rather than discriminating among different speakers. Id. at 513.
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Two more recent Supreme Court decisions only help to muddy the already
murky waters.' 27 In Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington,
the Court validated federal tax provisions that prohibited "substantial lob-
bying" by most tax-exempt organizations, but permitted unlimited lobbying
by tax-exempt veterans' organizations.128 Though Justice Rehnquist, for the
Court, acknowledged that "tax exemptions and tax-deductibility are a form
of subsidy that is administered through the tax system,"' 29 he also suggested
that "legislatures have especially broad latitude in creating classifications
and distinctions in tax statutes."' 30 The Court found that the mere refusal
to subsidize speech did not violate the first amendment, and that the dis-
criminatory classifications were not content based-the veterans' groups
could lobby whatever position they chose.' 3' Therefore, the Court found,
strict scrutiny was inappropriate, and rational basis scrutiny was satisfied
by the government's interest in rewarding veterans for their special services.' 32
In Bob Jones University v. United States, the Court found that a tax
statute and regulation that excluded a racially discriminatory school from
tax-exempt status did not violate the free exercise clause of the first amend-
ment. 3 3 In contrast to Taxation with Representation, the Bob Jones Uni-
versity Court did not suggest that a lower standard of review should apply
against the tax statutes than would apply against other statutes. 3 4 In finding
the statute valid, the Court found a "compelling" government interest in
ending racial discrimination in schools, and that no "less restrictive means"
could accommodate that interest.' 3
These two recent cases upholding tax exemptions and deductions still leave
uncertainty about what constitutional treatment is due a discriminatory tax
subsidy versus a direct subsidy. In the area of public campaign financing,
basing the scrutiny-level decision on whether the revenue mechanism is a
tax-based or a general appropriation scheme seems incorrect. Public subsidy
schemes must incorporate some method of measuring the popular support
for a party or candidate in order to determine qualification for subsidy or
to disburse payments in proportion to support. FECA utilizes past vote totals
of a party, and private contribution amounts, to assess the popular support
127. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); Regan v. Taxation with
Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
128. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540.
129. Id. at 544 (emphasis added).
130. Id. at 547.
131. Id. at 548.
132. Id. at 548-51.
133. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 604.
134. While the Court did not explicitly reject a lower standard of review for tax statutes,
its analysis utilized traditional strict scrutiny language and logic, suggesting relaxed scrutiny
was not appropriate. See id.
135. Id.
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of candidates and parties."a6 Most state schemes utilize some or both of these
methods. 31 7 Others, by using a designatable tax checkoff, allow the class of
taxpayers to indicate their support on tax returns. 38
That a state chooses to utilize past vote totals rather than current private
donations to determine the proportions of public subsidies should not affect
the level of equal protection scrutiny. If one state enacts a matching fund
system to subsidize candidates, and another enacts a tax deduction scheme
for contributors to candidates, the net result might be exactly the same-
the same public money subsidizing the same candidates. '39 Equal protection
scrutiny should not depend on how a state structures its subsidy mechanisms.
This argument suggests that given the Supreme Court decisions in Bob
Jones University and Taxation with Representation, 140 which upheld discrim-
inatory tax provisions, the same classifications accompanying direct expend-
itures must also be upheld as constitutional. Congress could provide direct
subsidies to all schools except Bob Jones University and other racially dis-
criminatory schools without violating equal protection.' 41 Similarly, Congress
could grant direct subsidies exclusively to veterans' groups, and allow them
to use the funds for lobbying purposes. Justice Rehnquist suggested as much
in a hypothetical posed in Taxation with Representation: Congress could
establish an organization to fight alcohol abuse, and allow funds to go for
lobbying expenses, and simultaneously establish an organization to fight
drug abuse, and prohibit lobbying expenditures by that group with public
funds.142 These hypotheticals based on the two recent cases seem to approve
an analysis that regards the level of equal protection scrutiny as independent
from the structuring of a state subsidy scheme as a tax plan or direct
expenditures. 141
For purposes of determining whether or not political party action is "state
action," on the other hand, the difference between a tax scheme and a direct
payment scheme may be significant. A tax subsidy scheme that lowers the
136. To determine subsidy levels for general election candidates, Subtitle H uses a political
party's past vote totals. See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text. To determine subsidy
levels for primary election candidates, Subtitle H includes a matching-funds provision. See
supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., supra notes 112-15.
138. See supra notes 116-17.
139. A tax scheme which provided a credit for 50% of political contributions up to a
maximum of $50 credit could result in an identical distribution of money as a matching-funds
scheme whereby the state provided political parties or candidates dollar-for-dollar matching
subsidies for private donations of $50 or less. The same result could also obtain if the state
employed a 'voucher' system by which every U.S. citizen received a coupon for $50 redeemable
by a party or candidate that received it as a donation.
140. 461 U.S. 574 (1983); 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
141. This is confirmed by Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973). See supra note 103
and accompanying text.
142. 461 U.S. at 548-49.
143. See Fleishman, Equality of Influence, supra note 14, at 403.
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tax base of a contributor to a certain organization does not delegate state
authority or resources to that organization such that its actions are now
"state actions."'" When the government provides direct grants to the or-
ganiztion, however, it may thereby delegate state authority also. 45 The rem-
edy may vary according to the structure of the subsidy program, but the
equal protection analysis, like the position of the challenging nonmajor voter,
remains the same.
III. APPRAiSING CURRENT STATE CAMPAIGN LAWS
Current state campaign laws vary widely with regard to their treatment
of nonmajor parties, candidates, and voters, and equal protection analysis
should recognize these differences. The first section of this part evaluates
state schemes that provide subsidies to candidates. Several of these schemes,
like FECA, elicit significant expenditure ceilings from subsidy recipients,
thereby avoiding strict scrutiny;' 46 most schemes, however, are subject to
strict scrutiny. 147 The second section evaluates schemes that provide subsidies
to political parties, considering two potential equal protection shortcomings.
First, some schemes may unconstitutionally discriminate against nonmajor
voters, candidates, and parties by providing funds to some parties and not
to others.' 4 Second, some schemes may result in unconstitutional discrimi-
nation by the actions of a "deputized" party, or by the state supporting
private discrimination by subsidizing a party's actions.' 49
A. Subsidies to Candidates
Twelve states and the District of Columbia provide for public subsidies
to certain candidates for public office." Five of the states avoid strict
scrutiny for discriminatory funding by conditioning the subsidies upon agree-
ment to significant expenditure ceilings.' 5' Seven states and the District of
Columbia do not condition subsidies on agreement to spending limits,' 52 and
144. There are instances when direct financial assistance by a state can delegate state action
to the recipient of the funds. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. Very different is a
state scheme that provides direct benefits only to individual contributors; it seems improbable
that an organization would be 'deputized' as a state agent by such a circuitous route through
its contributors. See supra note 106.
145. See, e.g., supra note 103 and accompanying text.
146. See infra notes 153-66 and accompanying text.
147. See e.g., infra notes 167-79 and accompanying text.
148. See infra notes 201-26 and accompanying text.
149. See infra notes 233-41 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 2 for citations to statutes from Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, District of
Columbia, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, Oklahoma,
Oregon, and Wisconsin.
151. See infra note 153.
152. See infra notes 167-200.
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the resultant strict scrutiny requires that some of these schemes be deemed
unconstitutional. Other schemes reveal compelling justifications for their
discriminatory requirements.
The five states that condition subsidies on expenditure ceilings utilize
different methods to define those ceilings, and utilize different mechanisms
to raise and distribute the subsidy revenue. 5 3 As long as the expenditure
ceiling is a significant one, the method of calculating it should be irrelevant.' 54
The differing subsidy mechanisms should affect only the issue of whether
or not a candidate's actions might be "state action."' 5 All five state schemes
should be subject only to the relaxed scrutiny the Buckley Court applied to
Subtitle H. All five should survive this scrutiny. 5 6
In Hawaii any candidate qualified for an election ballot who agrees to
expenditure ceilings and reporting requirements, and who has received a
certain minimum amount of private contributions, qualifies to receive dollar-
for-dollar matching funds up to a certain maximum. 5 7 A contribution to a
political candidate is tax-deductible only if that candidate has agreed to the
statutory expenditure limits. 18 The position of nonmajor voters, candidates,
and parties in Hawaii seems at least as favorable as that of those under the
153. HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 11-208, -209, -218 (Supp. 1984) (sets per-voter ceilings on
candidates who accept public funds; gubernatorial candidates, for example, limited to $1.25
per voter at last election), §§ 235-7(g)(2), 235-102.5 (Supp. 1984) (income tax checkoff clause,
and income tax deduction for political contributions); MICH. Corp. LAWS ANN. § 169.267
(West Supp. 1985) (gubernatorial candidates limited to $1 million in overall expenditures), §
169.261 (West Supp. 1985) (income tax checkoff); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 10A.25 (gubernatorial
candidates limited to the larger of $600,000 or 12.5 cents per state resident), § 10A.31 (income
tax checkoff which taxpayer can designate to particular parties) (West 1977 & Supp. 1985);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-7 (West Supp. 1985) (gubernatorial candidates limited to $1.05 per
voter at last election), § 54A:9-25.1 (West 1985) (income tax checkoff); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
11.31 (West Supp. 1985) (gubernatorial candidates limited to $500,000), § 20.855 (West Supp.
1985) (income tax checkoff).
154. The importance of an expenditure ceiling is its effect. See supra notes 59-60 and
accompanying text. This Note does not undertake a factual inquiry into the significance of the
five ceilings imposed here-it assumes that they in fact do restrict some overall spending. To
the extent that this factual assumption is incorrect, then the method of calculating the ceiling
is relevant, because if not effective, then strict scrutiny must be applied.
155. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
156. Some states require minimum levels of private contributions before allowing public
subsidies. See HAWAn REv. STAT. § 11-219 (Supp. 1984) (gubernatorial candidate must raise
$25,000 privately before receiing public money); MICH. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 169.264 (West
Supp. 1985) (candidate must raise 5% of spending limit before receiving public money); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-33 (West Supp. 1985) (the first $50,000 raised is not matched by public
money); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 11.50 (West Supp. 1985) (50 or 10% of spending limit must be
raised privately before receiving public money). These levels may operate to exclude some
legitimate candidates from public subsidy. But given the relaxed scrutiny, and Buckley's up-
holding of private contribution floors, it seems unlikely that these provisions are invalid. To
the extent that the minimums inhibit political parties or candidates from achieving popular
support, the levels should be struck down. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 96.
157. HAWAII REv. STAT. §§ 11-208 to -209, 11-217 to -229 (Supp. 1984), § 235-102.5 (Supp.
1984).
158. HAWAn REV. STAT. § 235-7(g)(2) (Supp. 1984).
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federal scheme: public funds are available to any candidate on the ballot,
without a minimum vote percentage required, and tax deductions are per-
mitted only for contributions to candidates subject to expenditure ceilings. 15 9
These public subsidies seem to meet a relaxed scrutiny under equal protection
analysis.
Michigan and New Jersey both provide matching funds to any candidate
for Governor in the general election who receives certain private contributions
and who agrees to expenditure ceilings.160 These state schemes treat nonmajor
voters as well as FECA does, and seem to meet a relaxed equal protection
scrutiny.
Wisconsin goes even further in protecting nonmajor voters from discrim-
inatory treatment. To qualify for public subsidy, a candidate must agree to
expenditure ceilings and must have raised a certain amount in private con-
tributions, after which all qualifying candidates receive equal amounts from
the general fund, up to a maximum of 45% of the overall expenditure
limit.' 6' This money may only be used in the general election, and only to
purchase media communications services, office supplies, or postage. 62 A
nonmajor candidate is not injured by this scheme which provides all qual-
ifying candidates with equal subsidies.
Minnesota seems to have based its scheme on FECA-dividing candidates
according to major and minor political parties and distributing funds based
on the parties' past vote totals' 63-but it utilizes more lenient qualification
requirements: any party that had a candidate who filed for statewide office
in the preceding election, or received greater than 10%0 of the vote in a local
race, or obtains 2,000 signatures on a petition for the current election, is
deemed to qualify for public subsidies. 164 Given these more lenient standards,
and the mandatory agreement to expenditure ceilings before receipt of any
public subsidies, the scheme does not invidiously discriminate against non-
major voters. Minnesota does employ a curious wrinkle of FECA's post-
election subsidy. After an election, any money remaining in the subsidy fund
is distributed to those statewide candidates who received more than 5% of
the vote, and to those legislative candidates who received more than 10%
of the vote.' 65 The validity of this scheme is more suspect because the vote
limits required to receive funding are higher than pre-election requirements,
159. Cf. 26 U.S.C. § 41 (1982) (permits tax deductions regardless of whether or not an
expenditure ceiling is agreed to).
160. MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 169.262, 169.267 (West Supp. 1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
19:44A-7, -29 (West Supp. 1985).
161. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 11.50 (West Supp. 1985).
162. Id.
163. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 10A.31 (West 1977 & Supp. 1985).
164. Id. at § 10A.01(13).
165. Id. at § IOA.31(7).
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and the state interest in excluding candidates from the funding is unclear.,"
The five state schemes that undergo a relaxed scrutiny because they elicit
significant expenditure ceilings from subsidy recipients thus probably survive
that scrutiny. Although their treatments of nonmajor candidates are not
ideal, they compare favorably overall with FECA.
Seven states and the District of Columbia provide public subsidies to
candidates without eliciting agreements to expenditure ceilings. 67 These
schemes must be strictly scrutinized because of discriminatory classifications
that infringe the fundamental rights to vote effectively and to run for public
office. Despite strict scrutiny, five schemes seem to be constitutional, because
any discriminatory aspects are slight, and outweighed by a vital government
interest. The distinguishing feature of these schemes is the leniency of the
qualifications needed to receive public subsidy.68
Alaska provides a tax credit of up to $100 for a contribution to the
political campaign of virtually any candidate for federal, state, or local
office. 169 Arizona allows tax deductions of up to $100 for contributions to
any political candidate. 170 Arkansas provides for tax deductions of up to $25
for contributions to any political campaigns in the state. 7' Oregon gives a
tax credit of up to $25 for contributions to any candidate listed on the ballot
or who has merely filed a declaration of candidacy. 7 2 The District of Co-
lumbia, "to encourage citizen participation" in the electoral process, allows
a tax credit of up to $50 for contributions to the campaign of a candidate
for any D.C. office. 173 Although strict scrutiny should apply to these schemes,
this scrutiny is not fatal in fact in these instances. A state has a compelling
interest in putting some restrictions on who may receive tax-reduced con-
tributions. If a state did not establish such criteria, the scheme would no
166. The provision probably is valid, however, given relaxed scrutiny and that Buckley upheld
a similar 5% post-election funding provision. 424 U.S. at 102.
167. See supra note 2 for citations to statutes of Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, District of
Columbia, Massachusetts, Montana, Oklahoma, and Oregon.
168. It has been suggested that any subsidy scheme which requires a candidate to receive
private money before she receives public money should fail equal protection scrutiny. The
argument analogizes matching-fund schemes to filing fees for ballot access, which have been
struck down if prohibitively high. See Fleishman, 1974 FECA Amendments, supra note 14, at
886-90, 894; Fleishman, Equality of Influence, supra note 14, at 405-06. Of course Buckley
upheld the requirement of $5,000 raised in each of 20 states before receiving matching primary
funds, but that was under a relaxed scrutiny. 424 U.S. at 106. Powerful arguments suggest
that money should be discouraged as a criterion for measuring public support of a candidate.
This Note does not consider whether the mere use of a matching fund mechanism might violate
equal protection under strict scrutiny.
169. ALASKA STAT. § 43.20.013 (1983).
170. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 43-1059 (1980).
171. ARK. STAT. ANN. 84-2016.5 (1980).
172. OR. REv. STAT. § 316.102 (1983).
173. D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1806.5 (1981 & Supp. 1985).
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longer just finance campaigns; it would also provide a tax shelter. 74 These
statutes seem to require only a minimum showing of a bona fide candidacy
in order to receive the subsidy, and this should pass constitutional stand-
ards. 171
In contrast, three states that do not elicit expenditure ceilings do require
that a candidate actually appear on a ballot in order to qualify for public
subsidy. 7 6 This raises the issue of whether qualifications required for ballot
access that are found constitutional are necessarily valid criteria for deter-
mining access to public subsidies. That is, does equal protection demand
different standards for access to a ballot than for access to a public subsidy?
Buckley upheld qualifications for public subsidies that were more stringent
than those for ballot access, 77 but only in the context of expenditure ceilings
that relaxed the judicial scrutiny. 78 When strict scrutiny applies to public
subsidy schemes, it may demand that qualifications for subsidies be more
lenient than those for ballot access.
A hint of this distinction is found in Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Buckley. 1
7 9
Rehnquist suggests that because a state must limit access to a ballot, while
it merely opts to provide public subsidies, a stronger case must be made to
justify discriminatory treatment regarding subsidies than regarding ballot
access:
[Congress,] while undoubtedly possessing the legislative authority to
undertake the task if it wished, is not obliged to address the question
of public financing of Presidential elections at all. When it chooses to
legislate in this area, so much of its action as may arguably impair First
Amendment rights lacks the same sort of mandate of necessity as does
a State's regulation of ballot access.1"0
In a subsidy scheme without expenditure ceilings, nonmajor voters can ac-
tually be injured by the relative decline in their candidates' abilities to finance
a campaign.' 8 ' While this injury is different from the injury suffered by
174. Without limiting "candidate," any gift to an individual could be dubbed a political
contribution and exempted from taxation.
175. Of course a showing that the effect of the statutes excludes any bona fide candidates
should invalidate these statutes, as violative of equal protection.
176. See supra note 2 for citations to statutes of Massachusetts, Montana, and Oklahoma.
177. A state could not, for example, use past vote totals as the sole means to gain ballot
access. A more exclusive self-perpetuating system would be difficult to find. See 424 U.S. 99-
102.
178. 424 U.S. at 95.
179. Id. at 290 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 293.
181. Of course, in campaigning and elections, all measures must be relative, because the
final result is always an election victory or loss relative to opponents. The failure to qualify
for public funds may itself also damage the image of a candidate or party.
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denial of ballot access, it is arguably no less serious.8 2 Equal protection
analysis recognizes the financial injury," and requires a compelling govern-
ment interest when no expenditure ceilings accompany the public funds. I1 4
The fact, therefore, that Massachusetts, Montana, and Oklahoma incor-
porate valid ballot qualification requirements into public campaign subsidy
requirements should not innoculate the subsidy programs from equal pro-
tection infirmities. 85 An exacting review of the statutes shows that two should
fail because no compelling interest justifies the discrimination, 8 6 and that
the third might survive, because the qualifications for subsidy are carefully
drawn. 117
182. The Buckley plaintiffs suggested that it is more difficult to win without money than
without ballot access, because write-in candidates can win elections. Appellants Brief at 158,
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). But the Buckley Court was correct to say that FECA
does not eliminate private funding, and the fact that a candidate has failed to attract any
private money is at least one reason not to fund him with public money. 424 U.S. at 94 n.128.
183. 424 U.S. at 95 ("denial of the enhancement of opportunity to communicate with the
electorate" is the injury considered).
184. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. Whereas in ballot-access cases the state
legitimately offers the practical necessity of a comprehensible ballot and an election that will
produce a substantial victor, see 424 U.S. at 96, in public subsidy cases the state can offer
only the interest in not funding "hopeless candidacies" and in avoiding "unrestrained fac-
tionalism" and the "artificial splintering" of political parties. Id. Some commentators have
urged that the rationale that defends discriminatory ballot-access schemes cannot be transplanted
to defend public subsidy schemes-different interests are involved. E.g., The Supreme Court,
1975 Term, supra note 14, at 186 n.103; Comment, supra note 14, at 887-88. In any event,
to the extent that an individual qualifies as a legitimate "candidate," a subsidy neither funds
a hopeless candidate, artificially splinters a party, nor causes unrestrained factionalism. Most
jurisdictions require some showing of support or real intention to run for office before bestowing
an official status of "candidate" on an individual. Merely proportional public financial support
is appropriate for candidates with relatively little popular support. This would seem to answer
the concerns with encouraging splinter parties. See 424 U.S. 97-98. Indeed, it has been suggested
that FECA actually creates artificial disincentives to normal factionalism. Nicholson, 1974
Amendments, supra note 8, at 364.
In ballot-access cases the government properly presents the compelling need to keep ballots
workable-to keep the number of names to a relative few, both so voters can comprehend the
choices, and to avoid the expensive and time-consuming prospect of frequent run-off elections
to achieve a victor with a substantial plurality. But when a government refuses to fund a
legitimate candidate, it cannot proffer such compelling justifications. There should be no fear
of providing voters with information about too many candidates. Indeed the first amendment
is better served by encouraging a lively debate and numerous challenges than by limiting support
to the majorities. There are no doubt practical limits to how many relatively unsupported
candidates a state should subsidize-restrictions excluding "frivolous" candidacies seem proper-
but strict scrutiny demands that since the state is muting the relative voices of such candidates,
it must show a compelling interest that cannot be less injuriously achieved. The ballot-access
standards serve very different interests, and should not be incorporated into public subsidy
qualifications. See Fleishman, Equality of Influence, supra note 14, at 398; Note, Equalizing
Candidates' Opportunities for Expression, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 113, 128 (1982).
185. See supra note 2 for citations to statutes of Massachusetts, Montana, and Oklahoma.
186. See infra notes 188-95 and accompanying text.
187. See infra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
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Massachusetts subsidizes statewide candidates in both primary and general
elections. 88 The state provides matching funds to candidates certified to be
qualified for either ballot. 8 9 A candidate not affiliated with a political party'90
can gain access to the general ballot only with a petition signed by at least
2% of the last total vote for the office sought.' 9' Strict scrutiny requires a
compelling reason for excluding a candidate with less than this 2% from all
public subsidy, 92 and no such reason appears forthcoming. Legitimate can-
didates and political parties may be seeking to build statewide support,
beginning with local write-in campaigns. The state scheme harms these efforts
by amplifying the relative voices of other candidates. Any interest in not
funding hopeless or artificial organizations or candidates could be met with
less restrictive requirements. 93
Montana subsidizes in equal shares the general election campaigns of all
candidates for governor-lieutenant governor nominated by political parties. 94
A "political party" is defined as "a party whose candidate for governor in
the last general election received 5% or more of the total votes cast for that
office." g Thus, a candidate whose party either did not run a gubernatorial
candidate, or whose candidate received less than 5% of the total vote in the
last election, is entirely excluded from public subsidy, regardless of popular
support now. No compelling state interest can sustain this severe discrimi-
nation. At the least, the scheme must permit a petition to show current
support and qualify for public funds, allow more "local" parties, and lower
the 5% figure.
Oklahoma provides money directly to candidates only after the campaign
commissioner certifies those statewide candidates that will be on the ballot. 96
Certified candidates can receive dollar-for-dollar matching grants. 97 Strict
scrutiny must protect legitimate candidates from discrimination, but an ex-
amination of ballot requirements suggests equal protection may be satisfied.
Apart from a party nomination, an individual can gain ballot access with
188. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 10, §§ 43 to 45 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1980), ch. 50, § 1, ch. 53,
§ 6, ch. 55A §§ 1 to 12, ch. 62, § 6C (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1978 & Supp. 1985).
189. Id. ch. 55A, §§ 2 to 7.
190. Id. ch. 50, § I (defines a political party as a political organization that received at least
3% of the most recent gubernatorial vote).
191. Id. ch. 53, § 6.
192. Massachusetts also requires minimum private contributions before receiving public fund-
ing, which likewise may violate equal protection. See id., ch. 55A, § 4.
193. A simple change would be to measure support in smaller units-counties for example-
and fund local nascent organizations proportionately. See Nicholson, 1974 Amendments, supra
note 8, at 353.
194. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 13-37-301 to -308 (1985).
195. Id. § 13-37-302.
196. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 18-101 to -113 (West Supp. 1984).
197. Id. tit. 26, § 18-109. (Oklahoma has no minimum threshold for its matching grants,
apparently recognizing the interests of nonmajor candidates).
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either a petition signed by 5% of eligible voters or by paying a filing fee. 198
Given filing fees that are merely high enough to avoid frivolous candidacies,' 99
Oklahoma may meet strict scrutiny with its subsidy scheme. 2°°
The validity of campaign finance schemes that discriminatorily provide
subsidies to some candidates and not to others, and that do not elicit
agreements to significant expenditure ceilings, seems to be determined by
whether or not the qualifications for receipt of a subsidy are anything more
than minimal. If the qualifications require something more than a bare
showing of the legitimacy of a candidacy-i.e. a candidate with some mod-
icum of support however humble-then the scheme must fail strict scrutiny
analysis because it lessens a legitimate candidate's chances of winning the
public's attention and support. If, however, the qualifications do no more
than ensure that public money does not inspire frivolous candidacies or offer
tax shelters, then they should survive the strict scrutiny because a state must
put some limits on who will receive public support as a "candidate."
B. Subsidies to Parties
Many states provide public subsidies to political parties rather than (or in
addition to) candidates. 201 Because FECA emphasizes subsidies to candidates,
these state schemes are more difficult to assess against Buckley standards. 202
198. Id. tit. 26, § 5-112. This provision was affirmed in Arutunoff v. Oklahoma State
Election Bd., 687 F.2d 1375 (10th Cir. 1982) cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983).
199. The fees prescribed are not negligible: candidates for governor must pay $1,500; U.S.
Congress -$500. This raises a factual issue about whether these figures raise barriers to legitimate
candidates.
200. Oklahoma does also provide money directly to political parties. This provision is con-
sidered below. See infra note 220.
201. See supra note 2 for citations of statutes from Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California,
Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode
Island, and Utah.
202. The fact that many states orient their subsidy programs toward political parties rather
than candidates raises a host of difficult issues. This Note approaches these issues only in a
limited way, by focusing on the position of nonmajor voters, candidates, and parties that have
been injured by being denied public subsidy. A nonmajor voter is injured similarly by denial
of funds to her favored candidate or to her favored party. Thus party subsidies may be subject
to a review similar to that attending candidate subsidies. A nonmajor voter may also be injured
by actions taken by a political party itself, such as a targeted spending effort against the voter's
preferred candidate. This and other such party actions are considered below. But other profound
issues arise when a state subsidizes a political party; issues which are apparently relatively
unaddressed in the literature, despite the many state schemes embracing parties.
A state certainly can integrate political parties into the structure of the electoral process by
allowing primaries as a road to ballot access, extensively regulating the entire mechanism, and
building the process of electing an official on the fact of party organizations. Buckley and
American Party upheld schemes that did this. See infra note 205 and accompanying text. In
these instances the party seems actually an arm of the state, operating part of the essential
electoral process, permissible because traditional parties have garnered widespread public support
and can accomplish primary election decisions that enable the state to avoid costly run-off
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Subsidies to parties must undergo two separate equal protection analyses.
First, a state might unconstitutionally discriminate against nonmajor voters
by the mere subsidization of some parties and not others. 203 Second, the
manner in which a party disburses public funds may itself violate consti-
tutional rights of a nonmajor voter, either as state action by the party or
by the state subsidization of private party action that discriminates against
nonmajor voters. 2°4
1. Discriminatory State Actions
When the Supreme Court twice upheld the constitutionality of public
subsidies given to some political parties and not others, it emphasized that
the funds went for specific purposes that helped achieve a manageable
ballot. 2 5 None of the state statutes discussed here limits in such a way the
public subsidies to the parties. 2° Because no expenditure ceilings are elicited,
strict scrutiny must be applied to these schemes. 2°0 Any discriminatory clas-
sifications thus must serve a compelling government purpose and use the
elections. Most current state schemes, however, do not limit their subsidies to such purposes.
Rather, public funds are normally provided relatively unrestricted to these organizations of
individuals. The party is funded not as an agent of the state to assist in the mechanism of
election, but as a collection of individual voters, an organization that plays an advocacy role
in the political arena.
It is plausible to argue that political parties are a special, even essential, component of
constitutional democracy in the United States, and that state support of parties is different
from state support of other ideological, quasi-party entities such as the American Civil Liberties
Union, the National Organization of Women, or the National Rifle Association. This Note
does not attempt to define any special constitutional status for political parties as ideological
collectives. Instead, it works from an assumption that as an ideological group a political party
should be treated equally with other ideological groups. A political party can be special because
of its integral role in the electoral machinery itself-earned by garnering sufficient public support
to warrant state-sanctioned primary elections. Perhaps public funds must be limited to subsi-
dizing that specific role.
The Supreme Court's only relevant treatment of the status of political parties occurred in
patronage cases. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
Even in these cases in which the Court disallowed the firings of certain public employees based
on their political affiliations, the Court did not establish a clear sense of the role parties play
in the public sector. See Freeman, Political Party Contributions and Expenditures Under FECA,
4 PACE L. REv. 267, 268 (1984); see also Casper, supra note 35, at 277-78. The cases do
unequivocally establish that it is a limited role that parties play. A considered treatment of the
fundamental issues raised by a state funding political parties as mere collections of individual
voters organized to promote certain vague principles, must be accomplished elsewhere.
203. See supra notes 69-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of this constitutional
issue.
204. See supra notes 82-108 and accompanying text.
205. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 104-08; American Party, 415 U.S. at 793.
206. Rhode Island does prohibit a party from spending the public subsidy on any candidate,
but it does not otherwise limit the party. It is unclear in any event how effective subsidy
restrictions are, given the ability of a party to shuffle funds among different accounts. See
Jones, supra note 8, at 297-98.
207. See supra notes 34-62 and accompanying text.
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least restrictive means possible to achieve that purpose. Most of these states
incorporate the ballot-access requirements for a party into the public subsidy
requirements, 2 8 but this should not guarantee equal protection validity.209
When political parties rather than candidates are the excluded entity, this
imperative is even stronger. A political party that itself might not appear
on the ballot can still sponsor and assist candidates to gain ballot access as
independents. The state's interest in restricting parties from ballot listing is
to delegate some of the electoral process to primaries run by political par-
ties-this can be done only for a few parties without threatening to expand
the ballot to an unmanageable size.210 The state's interest in restricting party
access to the ballot is thus intimately related to the interest in running an
efficient electoral system. Such a state interest cannot justify excluding a
political association from public subsidy. Just as with a candidate's ballot
access, merely by incorporating valid ballot access restrictions for political
parties into subsidy qualifications, a state does not avoid equal protection
infirmities.
Conspicuous discrimination occurs when a state plan includes exceedingly
high standards for receipt of subsidies. Alabama and Kentucky have state
income tax checkoffs by which a taxpayer may designate a political party
to receive a public subsidy.2 I Both states define a political party as an
organization whose candidates received at least 20% of the popular vote at
the most recent election for certain offices.2 2 Kentucky allows a taxpayer
to designate only those political parties that received at least 20% of the
total vote cast in the last general election. 2 3 This statute fails strict scrutiny;
it appears to fail even a relaxed scrutiny.214 Kentucky not only requires that
a party undertake a statewide campaign, it also mandates the very substantial
overall showing of 20%. No compelling interest of the state can justify
excluding from public subsidy parties that garner 15% of the statewide
popular vote (that may even be a majority party in some areas). 2 5 The need
to avoid funding "hopeless candidacies" or causing "unrestrained faction-
alism" could be far less intrusively served. 216
208. E.g., Alabama, Kentucky, Hawaii, Idaho, and Utah all utilize ballot standards. See
supra note 2 for statutory citations.
209. See supra notes 177-84 and accompanying text.
210. If the state permits too many primaries, then it may not achieve the goal of avoiding
too many run-off elections.
211. ALA. CODE § 40-18-146 (Supp. 1985); Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 141.071 to .072 (1982 & Supp.
1984).
212. ALA. CODE § 17-16-2 (1975); KY. Rav. STAT. § 118.015 (1982 & Supp. 1984).
213. Ky. REv. STAT. § 118.015.
214. Even a 'relaxed' scrutiny should require a figure lower than 20% statewide. Such a high
figure must place significant barriers before new parties trying to gain popularity.
215. Parties with actual majority support in some areas nonetheless might be denied public
subsidy. Such inhibitions on emerging parties must be struck down. See Fleishman, 1974 FECA
Amendments, supra note 14, at 897.
216. For example, by lower thresholds measured in more local areas.
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Alabama measures the 20% standard both statewide and county wide. 217
A taxpayer in a given county may only designate her tax checkoff to go to
those political organizations that received at least 20% of any statewide vote,
or at least 20% of a county-wide vote.218 This standard must also fail strict
scrutiny. The figure of 20% is simply too high to meet any vital government
interest in a least restrictive manner. By including countywide showings
Alabama improves over Kentucky's scheme, but the 20% requirement will
exclude legitimate parties, and thus unconstitutionally infringe on the rights
of nonmajor voters. 219
Other states utilize standards lower than 20% to determine subsidy qual-
ification,20 but strict scrutiny analysis strikes down as unconstitutional most
of these limits also. Both Rhode Island and Indiana, for example, allow
subsidies to support only those political parties whose gubernatorial candidate
at the last election received at least 5% of the popular vote.21 These schemes
must also fail exacting scrutiny; a party that enjoys significant popular
support may not qualify for public subsidies if it did not run a gubernatorial
candidate, or if its support is still relatively local rather than statewide, or
if its popularity has grown only since the last election.mn Strict scrutiny
demands that the state show a compelling interest in refusing to provide at
least proportional support to political organizations that receive even the
barest modicum of public support.23
Requirements that are minimal enough, of course, might survive even
exacting scrutiny, in light of the state's interest in not funding sham or
hopeless parties. Utah, for example, allows a political party to receive tax-
217. ALA. CODE §§ 17-16-2, 40-18-146.
218. Id.
219. It can hardly be denied that a party with the support of 15% of the electorate is a
legitimate political party.
220. See supra note 2 for citations to statutes of California (requires a showing of greater
than 2% of past vote to receive subsidies), Idaho (requires greater than 3%), Indiana (greater
than 5%), Iowa (greater than 2%), Maine (greater than 5%), North Carolina (greater than
10% of vote or signatures from 5,000 voters), Oklahoma (10%, signatures, or a filing fee),
Rhode Island (greater than 5%), and Utah (2% or signatures of 500 voters).
221. IND. CODE §§ 9-7-5.5-1 to -10 (1982 & Supp. 1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 17-12.1-12
(1981), 44-30-2(e) (1980 & Supp. 1985).
222. Indiana's statute was upheld despite equal protection challenge in Libertarian Party of
Indiana v. Packard, 741 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1984). The court rejected the equal protection
challenges that the plaintiffs urged were distinguishable from Buckley inasmuch as no expend-
iture ceilings were imposed in the Indiana scheme. The court stated:
In view of the discussion in Buckley about the strong governmental interest in
public financing of political parties, we find that the lack of any restrictions on
political parties' use of public funds under Indiana law does not render the Indiana
statutory scheme on its face violative of the plaintiffs' first amendment rights.
Id. at 988 n.4. The court treated this issue as a first amendment claim, but it was inextricably
connected to the equal protection claim. The court did remand to allow a factual showing of
discriminatory effect if possible. Id. at 991.
223. Even the barest support, so long as it is legitimate support, requires constitutional
protection as a component of the fundamental right to vote effectively.
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payer-designated subsidies if it either received 2% of the most recent vote
for a statewide candidate, or files a petition with signatures of 500 voters,
and holds a statewide convention. 224 A petition of only 500 signatures seems
a minimal requirement (even in Utah), and may well pass strict scrutiny. 22
Most states subsidizing parties fall between the extremes of Utah and Ken-
tucky. Strict scrutiny must proceed with attention to the effects of the
classifications, and strike down those schemes that cause relative injury to
any legitimate political parties. 226
2. Discriminatory Party Actions
A second type of equal protection infirmity can emerge in what a political
party does with public funds after it receives them. Any state scheme that
provides funds to political parties is subject to this infirmity, even if the
distribution to qualifying parties is itself constitutionally valid. 227 This con-
stitutional infirmity may arise in one of two ways. 228 The public subsidy may
delegate state authority and support such that in disbursing the funds the
party performs "state actions" subject to the fourteenth amendment, or the
party's private actions may infringe on constitutional rights of other private
parties such that a state subsidy would constitute an invalid support of
private discrimination. 229
Several state schemes may deputize political parties by detailing how the
public subsidies shall be used. 20 The more specific and comprehensive the
criteria controlling the subsidies, the more likely it is that the state has
delegated authority to the party, effectively deputizing it as a state agent.23
California and North Carolina, for example, both establish special com-
mittees to oversee the distribution of the public funds given to parties. 2
224. UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-3-2(g) (1984).
225. This presumes that a statewide convention is not a burdensome requirement, a fact-
specific assumption.
226. A caution must be added about using statewide measurements for subsidies to parties.
When candidate-oriented schemes use statewide measures to evaluate statewide candidates, there
is an obvious rationale. Funding is for statewide campaigns and for statewide offices, so support
can be measured statewide. This rationale is lacking when subsidies are given to parties. Parties
need not be statewide, and funding cannot constitutionally mandate this result. Local parties
must have access to funds in proportion to their state opponents. See Fleishman, Equality of
Influence, supra note 14, at 393-94.
227. A subsidy scheme that does not invidiously discriminate among parties can nevertheless
result in invidious discrimination that flows from actions taken by individual parties.
228. See supra notes 203-04 and accompanying text.
229. Id.
230. For example, see supra note 2 for citations to statutes of Alaska, California, Iowa,
Kentucky, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and Utah.
231. See supra notes 82-107 and accompanying text.
232. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 18760 (West Supp. 1985) (establishes committee composed
of party chairman and highest ranking party member in the state legislatures); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 163-278.42 (1982 & Supp. 1985) (establishes committee of party chairman, treasurer, and
local chairman, and two appointed by these members). See also IOWA CODE ANN. § 56.21
(West Supp. 1985) (names state central committee to allocate funds).
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The Texas statute reviewed by the Supreme Court in Nixon v. Condon233
contained similar provisions; it established that the state central committees
of political parties would determine primary voter qualifications.2 34 The Court
determined that such committees were subject to the fourteenth amendment
for purposes of determining those qualifications, because they were acting
as agents of the state. 235 California and North Carolina, by establishing
committees to dispense the funds, may have likewise delegated state authority
such that the fourteenth amendment applies directly to those committees'
actions. 236 Thus, a party committee in California or North Carolina would
face strict scrutiny in its decisions about who should receive what funds.
Several other states place no restrictions on how or by whom public
subsidies are to be spent. 237 Once the subsidy is disbursed, the party is free
to spend the money as it chooses. A subsidy to an organization may invoke
the fourteenth amendment against that organization by establishing special-
ized state support for a "private" entity.23s This connection between state
and political party seems more tenuous than when the state also prescribes
committees and regulations by which the party must dispense the funds, but
a United States District Court in Rhode Island has determined that when
the state subsidized a party with public funds it "deputized" the party
chairman such that his actions were "state actions" subject to the fourteenth
amendment. 239
Even when public subsidies do not deputize a party, equal protection can
be violated by state support of a private entity that infringes the constitutional
rights of individuals. 240 The importance of this proposition is that the equal
protection analysis can focus on party actions. Once enough state support
is demonstrated to show either that the party is effectively deputized as a
state agent, or that the state support is specialized and targeted such that
233. 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
234. Id. at 82.
235. Id. at 88.
236. Several states prescribe how public funds are to be spent, though not indicating a special
committee or individual to manage the funds. Requirements such as limiting spending to the
general election, see supra note 2 for citations to statutes of California, Iowa, Kentucky; or
limiting spending to candidate spending, not general party expenses, Alaska, North Carolina;
or prohibiting expenses for any particular candidate, Oklahoma, Rhode Island; may all establish
enough delegation of state authority to subject the disbursals of the money to the requirements
of the fourteenth amendment. See McKenna v. Reilly, 419 F. Supp. 1179, 1184 (D.R.I. 1976)
(court found state action in party chairman's disbursal of public funds, due to the integration
of the party and the state).
237. See supra note 2 for citations to statutes of Alabama, Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana,
Maine, and Oregon.
238. See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
239. McKenna v. Reilly, 419 F. Supp. at 1184. The court also determined that the statute
then in effect was silent as to how the party was to spend the public funds. Id. at 1181.
240. See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
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its validity depends on the actions of the recipient, equal protection analysis
examines the party action for constitutional infirmities. 24
The remaining issue is to suggest some party actions that might infringe
on equal protection rights of nonmajor voters, candidates, or parties. That
is, apart from issues of discriminatory funding to parties, there may be
discriminatory funding by parties. The analysis must focus on the rights
being protected against discrimination-the right to vote effectively, and the
derivative right to run for public office-and on the state interest in financing
political campaigns in the first place. Because unconstitutional aspects of
party actions would arise, if at all, in operation, with a factual record, this
Note can only suggest scenarios in which the voters may have been denied
equal protection. 242 These scenarios assume that the fourteenth amendment
is invoked either by the delegation of state authority to the political party,
or by a state subsidy subject as a specialized support of private party
action. 24a
The most interesting and common scenarios involve strategic decisions by
a political party on how best to utilize the public funds it receives. A
subsidized party may opt to provide greater support to certain of its ad-
herents-candidates or local branches-that will cause other of its adherents
to lose a proportional share of support. A subsidized party often may also
opt to funnel resources into campaigns that are particularly important, or
close, in order to get the most effect out of limited financial resources. Both
of these aspects raise difficult issues.
In McKenna v. Reilly,2" the court found unconstitutional a subsidized
party's financial support of one candidate for the party nomination over
another candidate. The unfunded candidate certainly was injured by the
party decision to spend public money in support of his opponent, and if
the state itself made the decision, it would violate his equal protection
rights. 24 5 To hold the party to this standard would be to restrict its use of
money to very basic, evenhanded distribution to all candidates, and to
prohibit a party from using public funds to influence its own nominations.
A second federal court has faced a case implicating the second scenario. 2"
Bang v. Chase involved a Minnesota statutory scheme that subsidized parties
241. This was suggested supra notes 82-107 and accompanying text, and lets analysis disregard,
for most purposes, the intricacies of particular statutory relationships between party and state,
and instead focus on the actions taken by a party that receives public subsidies.
242. Other equal protection infirmities may be manifest on the face of a subsidy statute-
exceedingly high vote requirements for receipt of subsidies, for example-but discrimination
by party action can only occur in practice, by acts of a party.
243. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
244. 419 F. Supp. 1179 (D.R.I. 1976).
245. No rationale could permit a state to pick favorites in various races and provide them
with extra state support.
246. Bang v. Chase, 442 F. Supp. 758 (D. Minn. 1977), aff'd, 436 U.S. 941 (1978).
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in proportion to their statewide vote totals; the funds, however, were disbursed
equally to all candidates of a given party, regardless of their level of party
support in their own district. The court found no rational basis for this
scheme and deemed it unconstitutional. 21 The rationale of this holding would
seem to prohibit a party from focusing its funds on a few strategic contests,
to the detriment of other contests.
Both cases suggest a very limited role for political parties in subsidy
schemes-they serve only as conduits for public money, and cannot interject
traditional strategic concerns in diverting money to particular contests or
regions. Although the effect of limiting parties to this role is uncertain, it
would seem to lessen the power of parties in the general electoral process.248
But most state schemes impose few restrictions on how a party may use
funds. One would suppose that parties commonly do focus funds into certain
strategic areas. The validity of public campaign finance schemes that permit
a political party to dispense funds in ways that would be unconstitutional
if done by the state itself, is doubtful. The fundamental rights that must be
protected from invidious discrimination are equally abridged by unequal
funding of candidates, whether the actual disbursement of funds ultimately
is accomplished by party action or state action. Party decisions to focus
public funds to a few contests or areas thus should be deemed unconstitu-
tional infringements of the rights of unfunded candidates and their sup-
porters. 249
CONCLUSION
Nearly half of the states in the United States employ some form of public
campaign financing for local elections 5 0 Most of these schemes were enacted
247. 442 F. Supp. at 758. The three-judge district court held:
the aggregate political party preferences expressed by all the state taxpayers in
Minnesota have no rational relation to the support for particular parties or for
particular candidates within legislative districts. Under this distribution scheme,
a party with state-wide plurality can unfairly disadvantage its opponents in those
districts where it enjoys little district support. Accordingly, we find that the method
of distribution of public campaign funds required by section 10A.31(5)(f) invid-
iously discriminates between candidates of different political parties and abridges
the First Amendment right of political association.
Id.
248. See generally Jones, supra at 8.
249. This suggests that any public funding of political parties that is not highly structured
and restricted, and that does not elicit some kind of 'countervailing denial' may be invalid.
Given the flexibility of political party accounting procedures, see supra note 206, it may be
impossible to distinguish public funds from private funds, and therefore any public subsidies
would subject much of a party's expenditures to fourteenth amendment scrutiny. Strategic
targeting of funds seems to violate this scrutiny. But see supra note 202 (discussing possible
special status of political parties).
250. See sources cited supra note 2.
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in the last decade, after Congress amended the Federal Election Campaign
Act (FECA) and established public subsidies for presidential campaigns.2 *
The Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo2 2 comprehensively reviewed FECA,
but similar state provisions subsidizing political campaigns have not generated
substantial case law. This Note has construed the Buckley decision, which
upheld the public financing of federal elections, and has applied that holding
to current state campaign financing schemes. The Buckley Court rejected
equal protection claims of discrimination against nonmajor parties and can-
didates, upholding a complex scheme that elicits a quid pro quo from those
parties and candidates that receive a subsidy, in order to impose some
restraint on the rising costs of political campaigns. State schemes that have
proliferated in the last decade unfortunately have not generally followed the
approach of injecting some public money into political campaigns in order
to rein in increasing overall expenditures, and to help reduce the significance
of wealth disparities among candidates and voters. Rather, most states dis-
tribute public subsidies as bonuses to political candidates and parties. When
states supplement private campaign funds with public funds, merely adding
public fuel to the private fire, equal protection demands that strict scrutiny
protect any candidates or parties who are excluded from public subsidy.
Discriminatory campaign finance schemes offer current major parties se-
ductive means to accumulate and maintain political power. Equal protection
scrutiny is essential to restrict such discrimination in the political arena.
When exacting attention is turned to the majority of the state schemes, far
too many embody unconstitutionally burdensome requirements for receipt
of public funds. At the least these state schemes must follow the principles
embodied in Buckley. One would hope state legislatures might go even
further-recognizing the special fluidity of American politics at the state and
local levels-and amend campaign subsidy schemes to operate evenhandedly
toward all legitimate parties and candidates who gain even modest public
support.
JOHN M. HAMILTON
251. See sources cited supra note 1.
252. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
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